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How does executive compensation influence voluntary turnover?

Corporate remuneration schemes can attract, retain, and motivate executives to exert effort and align their interests with shareholders’ interests. Prior studies find that executives are likely to resign when they are paid less than their peers, leading to a high rate of managerial turnover. However, paying excess compensation reduces firm value and it’s commonly related to firm underperformance. On the other hand, replacing top executives can be extremely costly for firms. Therefore, it’s very important to understand the reasons behind …

Study level
PhD, Master of Philosophy
Faculty
Faculty of Business and Law
School
School of Accountancy

Can executive compensation improve investment efficiency?

Since the last decade, there have been intense debates over whether executive compensation contracts are set optimally for interest alignment between management and shareholders. As Jensen and Murphy (2010) noted, the real problem of compensation is 'not how much you pay, but how'. While there is an agreement that performance-based pay can influence corporate investment decisions, the evidence is less clear on how and to what extent such a link is established. The real interest of this study is to …

Study level
Master of Philosophy
Faculty
Faculty of Business and Law
School
School of Accountancy

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